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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2012,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
deciding an issue of first impression, held that a party that enters a
consent order to settle potential liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)2
is not entitled to pursue a cost recovery action against other potentially
responsible parties under section 1073 of the Act, but may only seek
contribution from those parties under section 113(f) of the Act.5 The
court also affirmed a decision by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management to approve an exploration plan for oil and gas drilling in the Gulf
of Mexico after the Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster without requiring
an Environmental Impact Statement. The petitioners' challenge under
the National Environmental Policy Act7 and the Endangered Species
Act was rejected by the court.9 Finally, the court held that the United
States Fish & Wildlife Service's decision not to designate a critical
habitat for the endangered Florida panther was exclusively within the
discretion of the agency and thus not a violation of the Endangered
Species Act."0 District courts in the Eleventh Circuit also issued two

* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
1. For an analysis of environmental law during the prior survey period, see Travis M.
Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1223 (2012).

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
3.
4.
5.
6.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1233, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2012).
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 684 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2012).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
9. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1251-53.
10. Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1074 (11th

Cir. 2012).
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significant decisions under the Clean Water Act" in 2012. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency's determination that water quality
criteria to limit nutrient pollution in Florida waters should be numeric
rather than narrative. 2 The court went on to uphold parts of the Final
Rule setting out numeric criteria applicable to lakes, but struck down
criteria applicable to streams and certain streams entering unimpaired
lakes, concluding that they were arbitrary and capricious. 3 Finally,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia held
that Georgia's state law water quality protection scheme was sufficiently
different from that of the federal Clean Water Act and parties entering
consent orders with the state to settle potential liability under Georgia's
scheme are not protected4 from citizen suits under the Clean Water Act
for the same violations.'
I.

COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT

Deciding an issue of first impression, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc.,15
that a party obligated to remediate a hazardous site under a consent
decree with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may seek
reimbursement for its costs of remediation from other potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) only in a contribution action under § 113(f)
of CERCLA," and, under § 107(a) of CERCLA,17 may not pursue cost
recovery." The plaintiffs, Solutia & Pharmacia (S&P), were successors
in interest to the Monsanto Company, which produced polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) at a plant in Anniston, Alabama, from 1929 to 1971.
In 2002, EPA named S&P as defendants in a CERCLA enforcement
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, seeking remediation of PCB and lead contamination at two
sites in the Anniston area known as the PCB Site and the Lead Site. In
June 2003, S&P filed the present case in the same court, seeking
reimbursement of their costs of remediation in two counts: first, under
§ 113(f) for contribution as to costs they incurred at both the PCB Site

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. VI 2010).
Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1176 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
Id. at 1176-77.
Leakey v. Corridor Materials, LLC, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1350 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
672 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012).
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1233, 1237-38.
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and the Lead Site; and second, for cost recovery under § 107 as to costs
they incurred at the Lead Site only. In August 2003, to settle the
original enforcement action EPA entered into a Partial Consent Decree
(PCD) with S&P, under which S&P were obligated to remediate both the
PCB Site and the Lead Site, and under which they reserved the right to
seek contribution from other PRPs for their costs of remediating the
Lead Site.19

In 2005, EPA entered into a separate CERCLA settlement agreement
with Foothills Community Partnership, a group of PRPs, for reimbursement of EPA's costs of remediating lead contamination in the Anniston
area, including some areas that overlapped with areas addressed in the
S&P PCD. Members of this PRP group were also defendants in the
present case in district court. S&P filed a motion in the original
enforcement case seeking to have its obligations under the PCD
suspended on the ground that EPA, by entering into the 2005 agreement, had undermined S&P's right to seek contribution from the PRPs,
who were parties to the 2005 agreement.20 The district court agreed to
suspend S&P's obligations under the PCD provided they filed a motion
requesting that relief; but instead S&P resolved this issue with EPA in
July 2006 by entering into a stipulation clarifying the original PCD. The
stipulation required S&P to remediate four specified geographical zones
around Anniston, which included areas containing lead contamination.
The stipulation also preserved S&P's right to bring an action for
contribution against other PRPs for costs related to the remediation.21
Subsequently, the defendants in S&P's cost recovery and contribution
action who were parties to the 2005 settlement agreement (Settling
Defendants) moved for summary judgment as to both the § 107 cost
recovery claim and the § 113(f) contribution claim. Additionally, two
defendants in the case who had not settled with EPA in 2005 (NonSettling Defendants) moved for summary judgment only as to the § 107
claim. In June 2008, the magistrate judge deciding that case granted
summary judgment to the Settling Defendants as to S&P's § 113(f)
contribution claim because § 113(f)(2) bars a contribution claim against
a party who has resolved its liability to the United States in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement, which the 2005
agreement was. The magistrate also initially ruled that S&P could
proceed with their § 107 cost recovery claim against all defendants, but

19. Id. at 1233-34.
20. Id. at 1234. This is because § 113(f)(2) protects from contribution claims a party
that "has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
21. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1233-34.
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upon motions to reconsider vacated that part of its order in December
2009, and in July 2010 granted summary judgment to all defendants as

23
22
to S&P's § 107 claim. S&P appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit, based on its holding in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v.
UGI Utilities,Inc.,24 first held that S&P had a contribution claim under
§ 113(f) for costs it incurred in complying with the PCD and stipulation. 25 The court then held that S&P were not entitled to seek cost
recovery under § 107 for the same costs. 26 The court relied on two
recent United States Supreme Court cases-CooperIndustries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.,27 and United States v. Atlantic Research
Corp.2s-which explained and clarified the difference between a § 107
cost recovery action and a § 113(f) contribution action. 2' Based on
these cases, the Eleventh Circuit noted that cleanup costs incurred by
a party voluntarily and directly (that is, not incurred in reimbursing
another party) are recoverable only under 3§0 107(a), even if the party
incurring the costs is not an innocent party.
In contrast, a party forced to reimburse another party (such as EPA)
for cleanup costs may only seek reimbursement from other PRPs for
those costs in a § 113(f) contribution action.31 Unlike the joint and
several liability imposed by § 107, liability in a § 113(f) contribution

22. Id. at 1234-35. The Magistrate Judge based the reversal of the district court's
previous ruling on the stipulation, which had not been presented to the court before its
2008 ruling and which preserved S&P's right to seek contribution for its costs incurred,
which the Magistrate found meant that it could not also seek cost recovery under § 107 for
the same costs, and on cases from other circuits decided after United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1234-35.
23. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1233.
24. 463 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2006).
25. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236.
26. Id. at 1237.
27. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
28. 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
29. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1235-36.
30. Id. at 1235. Section 107 imposes joint and several liability on defendants, allowing
a party bringing a § 107 action to recover jointly or severally from any defendant in the
action. Id.
31. Id. Section 113(f) allows a party to bring a contribution action against any other
PRP "during or following any civil action under [42 USC § 96061 or under [42 USC
§ 9607(a)]." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Section 106 allows the government to order private
parties to take remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604. Section 107 creates a cause of action
for the government or for any other person voluntarily incurring "necessary costs ...
consistent with the national contingency plan" to recover costs of removal or remediation
against any responsible party, as defined in the code section. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
Thus, a party who would be entitled to bring a contribution action under § 113(f) would
necessarily be a defendant in a cost recovery action.
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action may be apportioned according to fault.32 Furthermore, parties
who have settled their liability to the government through an administrative or judicial settlement are protected from § 113(f) contribution
actions by other PRPs, but not from § 107 cost recovery actions.33
Because of these differences, the court concluded that § 113(f) should
be the only remedy for a party obligated to undertake remediation under
a consent decree, even though that party would incur those costs directly
rather than being required to reimburse a third party.34 The court
explained that:
[i]f a party subject to a consent decree could simply repackage its
§ 113(f) claim for contribution as one for recovery under § 107(a), then
the structure of CERCLA remedies would be completely undermined.
For example, parties[,... like Solutia & Pharmacia, could thwart the
contribution protection afforded to parties that settle their liability
would
with the EPA, like the Settling Defendants. This, in turn,
35
destroy CERCLA's statutorily-created settlement incentive.
The court also pointed out that allowing a § 107 recovery action for costs
incurred pursuant to a consent order would allow the plaintiff in that
action to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable, and those
defendants in turn would be barred from seeking proportional allocation
of those costs in a § 113(f) counterclaim because the plaintiff would have
the protection of § 113(g), 36 barring such a claim.37 As a result the
plaintiff, itself likely not an innocent party, could potentially recover one
hundred percent of its incurred costs complying with the consent
order.38
The opinion did not discuss whether the § 113(f) contribution claim,
which the court held that S&P had against the Settling Defendants,
survived those defendants' settlement with EPA in 2005, but presumably
it did not. Although the PCD and subsequent stipulation purported to
preserve S&P's right to seek contribution from other PRPs for costs S&P
incurred complying with the PCD, and the court held that S&P indeed
had the right to a § 113 claim generally for those costs, the Settling

32. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1235.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1236-37.
35. Id. at 1236 (citation omitted). The court characterized the Settling Defendants'
agreement with EPA as a settlement agreement and S&P's as a consent decree, but
consent decrees are in fact a form of settlement, because a PRP enters into one voluntarily.
Id. at 1236-37.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (2006).
37. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236-37.
38. See id.
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Defendants would also have the statutory protection from contribution
claims under § 113(g) as to any costs for which they and S&P could both
be liable.3" This would mean that S&P would be left without any claim
at all against the Settling Defendants, and would be left with contribution claims only against the Non-Settling Defendants.
II.

CLEAN WATER ACT

In Florida Wildlife Federation,Inc. v. Jackson,4" the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida issued several
holdings related to EPA's determination under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 4' that numeric rather than narrative criteria were necessary to
control nutrient pollution in certain Florida waters.42 The court held
that this initial determination was not arbitrary and capricious, and that
the numeric criteria in the Final Rule for lakes (Final Rule) were also
not arbitrary and capricious.43 Furthermore, the court held that EPA's
decision to adopt downstream protective values (DPVs) for lakes was not
arbitrary and capricious, and nor were the DPVs applicable to already
impaired lakes." However, the court held that the numeric criteria
applicable to streams and the DPVs applicable to non-impaired lakes
were arbitrary and capricious because EPA set the values without a
basis to conclude that nutrient levels above those values caused a
harmful increase in flora or fauna in the waters.4 Finally the court
held that EPA's authorization of site-specific alternative criteria and the
procedure it established for adopting that criteria were not arbitrary and
capricious.4 6
Nutrients occur naturally in surface waters, but they are also
increased by the introduction of certain substances in concentrated
amounts by human activity, notably wastewater treatment, power
generation, and agriculture.4" A nutrient increase in a body of water
can cause "significant changes in the ecosystem, in the health of plants
and animals, in the recreational value of waters, and in the safety of
drinking water."48

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1236-38; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g).
853 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. VI 2010).
Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77.
Id. at 1143.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 1143-44.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
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The addition of substances that cause or contribute to nutrient
pollution in water is regulated under the CWA. According to the Act,
states are allowed to set their own water quality standards and criteria
to meet those standards, unless EPA determines that a revised or new
standard is necessary, in which case EPA must "promptly" publish a
revised or new standard and adopt the new standard within ninety days
of publication.4 9 Water-quality criteria may be either narrative (that
is, a written description of a water-quality goal), or numeric (that is, an
absolute value).5"
Prior to 2009 Florida had a narrative criterion for nutrient levels in
state waters. 51 As early as 1998, though, EPA was aware that narrative criteria were not working to control nutrient pollution in Florida's
waterways. That year, EPA adopted a Clean Water Action Plan and
produced a report related to that plan in which it recognized that
nutrient pollution constituted a large part of the nation's water-quality
problem and that narrative criteria to control it were not working. The
report stated that EPA expected all states to implement numeric
nutrient criteria by the end of 2003. The Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (FDEP) was developing a numeric criterion by
2001. In 2003, FDEP submitted to EPA a plan for developing numeric
criteria that proposed to have a draft rule ready by October 2005. FDEP
subsequently pushed back its projected dates for developing a numeric
rule in 2004, 2007, and 2008, at which point its proposed time schedule
for producing a final rule, assuming possible political and administrative
challenges to a proposed rule, could have been as late as 2014.5 As a
result of this delay, in July 2008, environmental organizations filed suit
against EPA under the CWA citizen-suit provision, 3 seeking to compel
EPA to issue a numeric-criteria rule for nutrients in certain Florida
waters.54

49. Id. at 1144; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4).
50. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1145-46.
51. Id. at 1146. The criterion stated: "In no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body
of water be altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora or
fauna." Id.; see also Fla. Admin. Code r. 62-302.530(47)(b), availableat https://www.flru
les.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=62-302.530.
52. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1144-48.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
54. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52. The waters at issue in the case are those
classified "I" or "I" under Florida's rules. Class I waters are those assigned the uses of
"Fish Consumption; Recreation, Propagation and Maintenance of a Healthy, Well-Balanced
Population of Fish and Wildlife." Fla. Admin. Code r. 62-302.400(1) (2010). Class I waters
are assigned those uses and also "Potable Water Supplies." Id.
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In January 2009, while that case was pending, EPA made a formal
determination that Florida needed a new standard in order to comply
with the CWA (2009 Determination); then in August 2009 EPA and the
plaintiffs entered into a settlement resulting in a consent order, in which
EPA agreed to propose a numeric criteria rule for Florida by January
2010 and adopt the rule by October 2010 for lakes and streams and one
year later for coastal and estuarine waters. 55 With a small courtapproved delay EPA complied with the consent order; EPA published the
Final Rule setting numeric criteria57 for nutrient pollution in lakes in
56
flowing waters in December 2010.

Subsequently, twenty-five parties-including seven environmental
organizations, the State of Florida, and numerous industry and
agricultural trade associations-filed thirteen separate actions in Florida
district courts challenging the 2009 Determination and the Final Rule,
all of which were consolidated into the present case. The state and
industry parties contended that the 2009 Determination was arbitrary
and capricious. Those parties also contended that, even if the 2009
Determination was valid, the criteria for lakes and streams and the
default DPVs were arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid for two
reasons: first, the criteria in the Final Rule were not connected to the
designated uses of the water bodies to which they applied; and second,
they were not based on sound science. The environmental parties did
not challenge the 2009 Determination or the DPVs, but they did contend
that the lake and stream criteria were not protective enough and should
be corrected.58
The district court decided these challenges under the standard
applicable to a court reviewing an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act:5 9 a court must set aside an agency action if it is
"'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."'6 0 The court summarized its obligation under
this standard: "to make a searching and careful review of the Adminstra-

55. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1148, 1152.
56. The rule does not apply to flowing waters in an area of the state designated as the
South Florida Region. Id. at 1151.
57. Id. Two intervenors appealed to challenge the validity of the consent decree as
issued by the district court. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of
standing, holding that EPA's 2009 Determination, not the consent decree, was the basis
of the intervenors' alleged harm. Id. at 1153 (citing Fla. Wildlife Fed'n Inc. v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2011)).
58. Id. at 1153-55.
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
60. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1155; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA).
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tor's action but to be 'exceedingly deferential,' especially on matters
calling for scientific judgment."1
The court first upheld EPA's 2009 Determination that new or revised
criteria were necessary in Florida.62 The court noted that EPA had
concluded that narrative criteria were not working to reduce or even
control nutrient pollution in Florida waters, and "[tihe evidence
supporting the conclusion was' substantial, indeed overwhelming."6 3
The court also pointed out that FDEP had essentially agreed with this
conclusion since as early as 2003 and had "never wavered from that
position."' The court discussed six contentions made by the challengers, including one on the basis that EPA did not need to act because the
state was actively working toward developing numeric criteria for
nutrients.5 The court noted that EPA's authority under the CWA
allows it to determine whether a new standard is necessary, but not
necessarily that EPA, rather than the state, should be the entity to
promulgate the standard.6 Nonetheless, the court pointed out that
under FDEP's watch the numeric standard had been subject to
seemingly indefinite delay, and assumed that EPA "may properly take
into account the likelihood that a state will correct the problem itself."7
The court rejected other bases for challenge as not being supported by
facts or law."
Turning to the challenges to the substance of the Final Rule, the court
noted two bases for its review of EPA's exercise of discretion in
promulgating the rule.69 First, EPA had explained its goal in developing the numeric rule as an effort to translate Florida's existing narrative
criterion into numeric criteria." Second, Florida had interpreted its
narrative criterion to prohibit not any change in natural populations of
flora and fauna, but only a harmful change.71
Considering first the challenges to the lake criteria, the court
concluded overall that the numeric criteria set out in the Final Rule

61. Fla. Wildlife, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. The court preceded this summary with a
thorough discussion of the standard of review. Id. at 1155-56.
62.
63.
64.
party
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1157.
Id. The court found "especially curious" the fact that the State of Florida was a
challenging the 2009 Determination in the case. Id.
Id. at 1157-60.
Id. at 1158 n.16.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1160-61.
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1160-61.
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were not arbitrary and capricious.7 2 First, the state and industry
challengers objected to the Final Rule's classifying lakes based on their
response to nutrients based only on color and alkalinity.v3 The court
concluded that this classification was not arbitrary and capricious. 4
Second, the state and industry plaintiffs challenged the Final Rule's
setting independent numeric criteria for three parameters in lakes:
chlorophyll, total nitrogen, and total phosphorus-that is, under the
Final Rule, a lake could not be unimpaired unless it met all three
criteria independently.75 The court concluded this requirement for a
lake to be unimpaired was not arbitrary and capricious.7" Third, the
environmental parties challenged the Final Rule's provision that for a
lake to be considered impaired the mean of a parameter must exceed its
numeric limit in more than one of three consecutive years. The
challengers argued that this definition does not sufficiently protect
recreation or drinking water uses.77 The court appeared sympathetic
to this argument, but it concluded that "[w]hile the issue is not free of
doubt, I resolve the question
in [EPA'sI favor, giving substantial weight
78
to the standard of review."

The court also concluded that the Final Rule's nutrient criterion for
springs was based on scientific judgment within EPA's discretion and
was not arbitrary and capricious." However, the court held that the
Final Rule's nutrient criterion for streams was arbitrary and capricious."0 EPA's goal in adopting the numeric criteria was to translate
Florida's narrative criterion into numerical standards, and Florida
should interpret its narrative criterion to protect water bodies from a

72. Id. at 1161-62.
73. Id. at 1162.
74. Id. Challengers claimed EPA had ignored other relevant characteristics that could
influence the effect nutrients would have on a particular lake, principally, temperature,
high color, and the fact that high levels of phosphorous occur naturally in the West Central
Region of the state. Id. at 1162-63. The court concluded that EPA's decision not to take
these characteristics into account in classifying lakes was not arbitrary and capricious. Id.
at 1163.
75. Id. at 1164. Challengers claimed that since chlorophyll measures algae growth, and
nitrogen and phosphorus contribute to algae growth, a lake should only have to meet the
chlorophyll criterion to be considered unimpaired. EPA explained that high nitrogen and
phosphorus levels are predictors of algae growth before it occurs, and thus could potentially
be used to prevent algae growth before it spikes. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1165.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1166-67.
80. Id. at 1169.
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harmful increase in nutrient levels. 81 The court interpreted the Final
Rule as applied to streams to prevent any increase in nutrient levels.82
The court held that this approach to stream protection was arbitrary and
capricious, both because it differed from EPA's stated goal and because
EPA provided no scientific basis for preventing any change in nutrient
levels in streams.8
Furthermore, the court upheld EPA's decision to enact DPVs, noting
that the reasonable effect of DPVs would be to apply nutrient limits to
a stream that was causing nutrient levels in a lake to be unacceptably
high, even if nutrient levels within the stream itself met the stream
criteria.' However, the court struck down the Final Rule's DPV levels
as they applied to an unimpaired lake, finding the same flaw in these
default DPV levels as with the stream criteria: they prohibited any
change in nutrient levels in the lake, not just harmful changes.8 ' The
court also upheld the Final Rule's application to canals and EPA's
adoption of site-specific alternative criteria, which would allow EPA to
raise or lower criteria for a particular water based on specific conditions
at that site.8
In Leakey v. CorridorMaterials, LLC,8 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia held the opportunities for public
participation during an enforcement proceeding provided for by the
Georgia Water Quality Control Act 88 and the Georgia Administrative
Procedure Act89 are not comparable to those provided under the federal
CWA, and thus a consent order entered into by a party with the State
of Georgia under state law did not bar an action to enforce the CWA
under the citizen-suit provision of the CWA.9 ° The defendants owned
and operated a quarry in Hancock County, Georgia. The plaintiffs
owned land downstream from the quarry site, including a two-acre pond
and associated wetlands. In 2007 the defendants obtained a Surface
Mining Permit, a Water Quality Permit, and an Air Quality Permit from
the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD) for the operation
of the quarry. In 2008 the defendants conducted extensive clearing and
other site preparation activities. Subsequently, the EPD issued two

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id. at 1168-69.
Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1171-72.
839 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-20 to -586 (2012).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
Leakey, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1347, 1350.
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Notices of Violation to the defendants related to the discharge of
pollutants into wetlands on the defendants' property and other state
waters. To resolve these violations, in May 2009, the defendants entered
into a consent order with the EPD, which required the defendants to pay
a $20,000 fine and to implement various remedial activities related to
the discharges."s
In January 2010 the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants under
the CWA's citizen-suit provision to enforce provisions of the CWA related
to the defendants' land-clearing activities, including the discharge of
pollutants into state waters on the plaintiffs' land and the failure to
obtain certain permits.9 2 The defendants moved for dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
CWA's limitation on the actions provision. 93 The court noted that
relevant to the plaintiffs' claim in this case, the CWA bars citizen suits
against a party for claims for which a state has issued a final order not
subject to further judicial review and the party has paid a penalty
assessed under a comparable state law.94
Furthermore, the court held the limitation on the actions provision of
the CWA did not bar the plaintiffs' citizen suit.95 The court concluded
that while the May 2009 consent order entered into between the
defendants and the Georgia EPD was a final order not subject to review,
and the defendants had paid a penalty, the Georgia Water Quality
Control Act and relevant provisions of the Georgia Administrative
Procedure Act did not constitute "comparable [s]tate law" and thus an
element necessary for the citizen suit bar to apply was not present. 6
The court reached this conclusion primarily because the opportunities for
public participation in the consent order process are not comparable.9"
The court used the standard from McAbee v. City of Fort Payne98 and
applied the Eleventh Circuit's "rough comparability test."99 In that
case the Eleventh Circuit held that a court needing to determine
whether a state's statutory enforcement scheme was comparable to that
of the CWA should focus on three categories-penalty assessment, public
participation, and judicial review-and each category independently

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1342-43.
Id.
Id. at 1343-44; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(gX6)(A).
Leakey, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1344; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).
Leakey, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
Id. at 1345-47, 1350.
Id. at 1350.
318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
Leakey, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47.
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must be "'roughly comparable'" to the corresponding category in the
CWA's enforcement scheme. 100
The district court in Leakey concluded, as the Eleventh Circuit had
done regarding Alabama's enforcement scheme in McAbee, that the
public participation opportunities under Georgia's enforcement scheme
were not comparable to those under the CWA. 1' The court noted,
"The CWA provides 'interested persons,' which essentially means anyone,
with the right to public notice and an opportunity to comment, the right
to present evidence if a hearing is held, and the right to petition for a
hearing if one is not held" during a CWA enforcement action.1" 2 In
contrast, the Georgia enforcement scheme's0 3 public participation
provisions allow participation only by parties who are aggrieved or
adversely affected by any action or order, and the right arises only upon
service of the notice of action or order on those parties.' 4 The court
noted that members of the public, including the Leakeys, were not
"aggrieved or adversely affected" by the consent order, nor would the
order have been served on them.0 5 Furthermore, the Georgia scheme
did not provide for public notice or opportunity to comment on the
proposed enforcement action prior to the entry of a consent order.'
In contrast, the court noted, the CWA provisions "allow members of the
general public, even those who have not suffered an injury, to participate
in the enforcement process before and after the issuance of a penalty
order."0 7 The court held that in this regard, the Georgia scheme was
even less comparable to the federal one than the Alabama enforcement
scheme in McAbee that the Eleventh Circuit had rejected as not
comparable to the CWA, in that the Alabama statute did require public

100. Id. at 1346-47 (quoting McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1254, 1256). The district court noted,
as the McAbee court had, that the CWA limitation on actions provision is unclear as to the
scope of state law provisions that may be compared to the CWA; that is, whether a court
should compare the state's "'overall'" statutory enforcement scheme to the CWA's, or only
compare the specific state statute under which the state had commenced the action against
the defendant. Id. at 1347 (quoting McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255 n.8). Both courts declined
to resolve this ambiguity, because both concluded that even assuming the broader category
of state law for comparison, the state law was still not comparable to the CWA. Id. at 1347
(citing McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255 n.8).
101. Id. at 1347.
102. Id. at 1348 (quoting McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4).
103. For purposes of comparison, the court considered both the Georgia Water Quality
Control Act and the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. Leakey, 839 F. Supp. 2d at
1348-49; see also O.C.GA.. §§ 12-5-43(a), 50-13-14.
104. Leakey, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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notice in a newspaper of the issuance of an enforcement action.'0 8 As
a result, assuming this ruling stands on appeal, parties entering into
consent orders with the Georgia EPD regarding water quality violations
are not protected from citizen suits brought under the federal CWA.' °9
III.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY ACT &
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,"0
the the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's (BOEM)"' approval of an Exploratory Plan submitted by Shell
Oil for oil and gas drilling off the coast of Alabama following the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, rejecting a challenge by the petitioners that
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)"2 and the Endangered
Under the
Species Act (ESA)"3 were violated by the approval.'
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)" Shell submitted this
particular Exploratory Plan for a lease it purchased during a multi-year
lease-sale conducted by BOEM. 116
OCSLA authorizes the sale of
offshore oil and gas drilling leases, including in the Gulf of Mexico. It
sets out a four-stage process for the agency conducting the sales: first,
the development of a leasing program; second, sales of leases; third,
exploration by the lessees; and fourth, development and production.'17
BOEM, the agency in charge of leases, developed a leasing program for
western and central regions of the Gulf of Mexico for the years 2007 to
2012, and produced an environment impact statement (EIS) for the
program as required by NEPA that would apply to eleven leases in this
program." 8
BOEM produced a supplemental environment impact
statement (SEIS) in 2009 for seven remaining lease sales in the
program. Both EISs concluded that drilling activities in the Gulf under
the 2007-2012 lease program would not significantly affect the environ-

108. Id. at 1348-49.
109. Id. at 1350. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
following Leakey, reached the same conclusion regarding the comparability of the Georgia
water quality enforcement scheme with the CWA. Kendall v. Thaxton Road LLC, No. 1:09CV-3520-TWT, 2013 WL 210892, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 2013).
110. 684 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2012).

111. An agency of the United States Department of the Interior.
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
113. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
114. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1245-46, 1253.
115. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
116. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1245-46.
117. Id. at 1246.
118. Id. at 1246-47; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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ment. They took into consideration the possibility of a large oil spill, but
concluded that such a possibility was small, and even if one occurred it
would not be "catastrophic" to the region, animal populations, and
ecosystems. 1 9 The Deepwater Horizon spill occurred in April 2010,
and as a result BOEM undertook another SEIS that was completed in
January 2012. The 2012 SEIS found no new information to change the
conclusions of the 2007 EIS and the 2009 SEIS."2 ° Also, following the
Deepwater Horizon spill,
BOEM began requiring environmental
assessments (EAs) 12 ' for any application to drill that would involve the
use of a blowout preventer. 2 2 Finally, BOEM reinitiated consultation
with the United States Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service, pursuant to the ESA, to determine
whether continued
123
lease sales would jeopardize listed species.
Shell submitted the Exploratory Plan at issue in March 2011. BOEM
produced an EA for the Exploratory Plan that was tied to the the 2007
EIS and the 2009 SEIS (but not the 2012 SEIS), which concluded that
it would not "significantly affect the quality of the human environment
within the meaning of NEPA."'24 BOEM approved the Exploratory
Plan in May 2011, and the petitioners filed this action in June 2011.125
The petitioners contended that BOEM's decision not to prepare an EIS
for the Exploratory Plan violated NEPA. The petitioners raised four
objections to the decision: first, that BOEM failed to include site-specific
information in its evaluation; second, that BOEM failed to use the
Mechanical Risk Index methodology to evaluate the risk of a spill; third,
that an EIS could provide additional information on the Deepwater
Horizon spill; and fourth, that BOEM improperly relied on the 2007 EIS
and 2009 SEIS, given that BOEM had already recognized the need for

119. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1247.

120. Id.
121. Regulations allow an agency required to review the environmental impact of a
federal project to produce an EA to determine whether a more extensive EIS is required;
if not, the agency makes a Finding of No Significant Impact. 40 C.F.R. 1508.9 (2012); see
Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1246-47.
122. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1247.
123. Id. at 1247-48. The ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions do
not jeopardize the existence of any listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If a proposed
action may affect a species, the agency must consult with either the United States Fish &
Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2012).
An agency must reinitiate consultation if new information arises that was not examined

in the initial consultation. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2012). Here, the agencies' reinitiated
consultation remained ongoing when BOEM approved the Shell EP and when the case was
decided. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1248.
124. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1248.
125. Id.
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SEIS to evaluate information from the Deepwater Horizon
an additional
126
spill.

The court rejected these challenges. 2 ' The court reviewed the
petitioners' claims under the deferential "arbitrary and capricious"
standard required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 128 examining
the agency's decision not to produce an EIS only to ensure that the
agency took a "hard look" at potential environmental concerns associated
with its action. 129 First, the court concluded that the EA did include
sufficient site-specific information, including an evaluation of the
potential for an oil spill. 3 ° The petitioners appeared to focus on the
EA's lack of evaluation of the possibility and effects of a catastrophic
spill such as the Deepwater Horizon spill, but the court pointed out that
the project, and the EA, concerned operations under the Exploratory
Plan, "not an expected oil spill from those operations."' 3' Second, the
court concluded that BOEM was not required to use the methodology to
assess the risk of a blowout advocated by the petitioners. 3 2 The court
noted that no evidence suggested that methodology was standard in the
industry, and pointed out also that the choice of methodology to evaluate
risks was a decision based on "'complex scientific data within the
agency's technical expertise."' 33 Third, the court concluded that
BOEM was not required to wait until the effects of the Deepwater
Horizon spill were fully known-which could take years-in order to go
forward with the lease-sale projects, explaining that under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, "[eixploration plan approval decisions are
based upon existing available information."'34 Fourth, the court
concluded that BOEM's reliance on the 2007 EIS and 2009 SEIS in not
requiring an EIS for the Shell Exploratory Plan was not arbitrary and
capricious because BOEM included all information then available to it
in its EA of the Shell Exploratory Plan, and BOEM's 2012 SEIS did not
contain any information that would alter the conclusions of the earlier
EISs.'3 5

126.

Id. at 1249-51.

127.

Id.

128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
129. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1248-49 (quoting Hill v. Bog, 144 F.3d 1446,
1450 (11th Cir. 1998)).
130. Id. at 1250.
131. Id. at 1249-50.
132. Id. at 1250.
133. Id. (quoting Miami-Dade Cnty. v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1065 (11th Cir. 2008)).
134. Id. at 1250-51; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1346(d).
135. Defenders of Wildlife, 684 F.3d at 1251.
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The petitioners also challenged BOEM's approval of the Shell
Exploratory Plan under the ESA, contending that because BOEM
reinitiated consultations with the National Marine Fisheries Service and
the United States Fish & Wildlife Service following the Deepwater
Horizon spill, BOEM in essence conceded that its initial consultation was
inadequate, and it was required to complete the new consultation before
approving the Exploratory Plan.'36 The court rejected this challenge
as well."' The court found no basis to conclude that BOEM's choice
to reinitiate consultation automatically invalidated the biological
opinions (that oil drilling in the region would not jeopardize any listed
species) that resulted from the agencies' initial consultation. 13 The
court also noted that BOEM had considered the possible effects of an oil
spill following the Deepwater Horizon spill in its EA of the Shell
Exploratory Plan, and while the agency did see some basis for concern
that a spill would put certain listed species at risk, it concluded that the
overall impacts would be minimal "based on the low probability of a spill
occurring."' 39 For these reasons, the court held that BOEM's decision
to approve the Exploratory Plan without first concluding its reinitiated
consultation under the ESA was not arbitrary or prohibited by the
4
ESA.' 0
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In Conservancy of Southwest Floridav. United States Fish & Wildlife
Service,' the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fish & Wildlife Service's
(F&WS) denial of the plaintiffs' petition to designate critical habitat for
the Florida panther, a listed endangered species under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),' 42 was a decision committed to agency discretion by
law and thus not subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)'43 because the panther was listed prior to the
1978 amendments to the ESA, which made the agency's designation of
critical habitat for species listed prior to the amendments discretionary
rather than mandatory, and no law exists that provides standards
governing the agency's exercise of that discretion.'"

136. Id. at 1251-52.
137. Id. at 1253.
138. Id. at 1252.
139. Id. at 1253.
140. Id. at 1252-53.
141. 677 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2012).
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
143. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
144. Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1074, 1078-79.
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The precursor to the ESA, the Endangered Species Preservation Act
(ESPA), 145 was enacted in 1966.146 The ESPA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to list a species as endangered upon finding that "'its
existence is endangered because its habitat is threatened with destruction, drastic modification, or severe curtailment.... 1 4 7 However, the
ESPA did not require the Secretary to designate critical habitat for a
listed species. The ESA was enacted in 1973, and in its original form it
also did not require the designation of critical habitat. The ESA was
amended in 1978 to provide, among other things, that the Secretary was
required to designate critical habitat for an endangered species at the
time such species was listed as endangered. Under the current version
of the ESA, the Secretary must, at the time of listing a species as
endangered, designate any habitat considered to be critical at that
time.148 However, the 1978 amendments included an exception for
species listed prior to 1978, providing "'Critical habitat may be
established for those species now listed as threatened or endangered
species [that is, at the time the 1978 Amendments took effect] for which
no critical habitat has heretofore been established . . . .,"'
The
Secretary listed the Florida panther as endangered in 1967, and no
critical habitat was designated for the panther at that time or since. 50
In 2009, environmental advocacy groups petitioned F&WS pursuant
to the APA to designate critical habitat for the panther, citing scientific
studies including some relied on by the F&WS in its own Florida
Panther Recovery Plan, demonstrating the decline of the panther
population due to loss and degradation of habitat. F&WS denied the
petition in February 2010, explaining that other efforts F&WS was
taking to protect the panther's habitat were sufficient without the
designation of critical habitat. The plaintiffs then filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming
that F&WS's denial of their petition was arbitrary and capricious under
the APA, and sought an order vacating the denial and remanding to
F&WS. F&WS and other defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, on the ground
that, among other reasons, APA review was unavailable because F&WS's
decision was one within the absolute discretion of the agency and not

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1074-75.
Id. at 1075; see also ESPA § 1(c), 80 Stat. at 926.
Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1075-76; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1076; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(B).
Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1076.
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The district court dismissed the case on

this ground, and the plaintiffs appealed.'52
The Eleventh Circuit aflirmed the dismissal because the decision to
designate critical habitat for a species listed prior to the 1978 Amendments to the ESA was discretionary, not mandatory, and with regard to
whether to designate critical habitat in this circumstance, existing law
provided "'no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion.'' 1 3 The court explained that under the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation ofjudicial review of agency action
in the APA, F&WS's decision not to designate critical habitat for the
panther was "committed to agency discretion by law" under the APA and
not subject to judicial review."5
The plaintiffs pointed to three agency regulations that they contended
provided standards for judicial review: 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(d),15 which
provides that upon receiving a petition to designate critical habitat, the
agency "shall promptly conduct a review in accordance with" departmental regulations.'5 6 Those regulations in turn provide specific guidance
the agency must follow in determining critical habitat for a listed
species, and that these regulations in turn provide standards for judicial
review." 7 The plaintiffs also argued that 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a), 58
which requires the agency to make a critical habitat designation based
on the best scientific data, provided such standards.5 5
The court
concluded, however, that based on context these regulations did not
apply to a decision whether to designate habitat for a species listed
before 1978 (that
is, the agency's decision whether to designate critical
160
habitat at all).

151. Id. at 1076-78. In support of this ground, the defendants relied on an APA section
providing that APA provisions subjecting agency action to judicial review are inapplicable
"to the extent that ... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Id. at
1078; see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(aX2).
152. Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1078.
153. Id. at 1078-79 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
154. Id.
155. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(d) (2012).
156. Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1079; see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(d).
157. Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1079; see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (2012).
158. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a).
159. Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1080.
160. Id.

